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Abstract: By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks 
in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some 
types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and 
presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper 
explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from 
ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike 
typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive 
to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical 
terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I 
conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and 
practical arguments from ignorance.   
 
Keywords: argument from ignorance, burden of proof, defeaters, Douglas Walton, initial presumption, negative 




Imagine that two tourists, Smith and Jones, get lost in a new city and Smith asks a random 
person for directions. This person, who appears to live there, tells him that the shortest way to 
reach the city center is to take the second street to the right. The circumstances are usual, there 
is nothing suspicious about this person (let’s name her Jill) or her directions, and Smith finds 
it reasonable to believe that she is telling the truth. “It’s the second street to the right then” 
says Smith, Jones agrees with him and they start walking. A few minutes afterward, however, 
Jones turns to Smith and asks him: “What makes us so sure that those directions were 
correct?”  
 How should Smith respond to this question? Is he immediately obliged to provide 
(additional) reasons for trusting Jill? Intuitively, he is not. Since Jones unexpectedly retracts 
the initial commitment (“The shortest way to reach the city center…”) and he based this 
commitment on transparent and uncontroversial grounds it is him, rather than Smith, who 
seems obliged to provide reasons. He could say, for instance: “Don’t you see that we are 
heading towards suburbs? Jill was probably confused,” or “I read in the travel guide that 
locals usually deceive tourists for fun.” However, if Jones fails to provide convincing 
defeaters, Smith’s claim stands good as it is. Put technically, the proposition p (“The shortest 
way to reach the city center...”) has a “presumptive” status: (1) p asymmetrically distributes 
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dialectical obligations, and (2) p is taken as acceptable until or unless the opponent can prove 
that it is unacceptable.  
It may seem that the previous characterization of a presumptive status has the structure 
of the “argument from ignorance.” There are at least two reasons which underlie this intuition. 
First, arguments from ignorance, just like presumptions, are often characterized in terms of 
shifting (reversing) the burden of proof (see Walton 2014, p. 2; pp. 190-200). Second, the 
conclusions of the argument from ignorance, similarly to presumptions, are supposed to stand 
good precisely because we are not aware of sufficient reasons to the contrary (Krabbe 1995). 
On the surface, the two appear theoretically similar.  
In argumentation theory, the similarity has been repeatedly stressed by Douglas 
Walton (e.g., 1993, 1996, 2001, 2008a), one of the leading authors on both presumptions and 
arguments from ignorance. In his opinion, the argument from ignorance could explain the 
crucial features of presumptive reasoning.  
 
Not only is it right to say that the argumentum ad ignorantiam is closely linked to 
presumptive reasoning and burden of proof. You could even say that the very structure 
of the argumentum ad ignorantiam is an expression of how presumptive reasoning and 
burden of proof can function correctly in argumentation to shift a presumption to the 
other side in a dialogue. (Walton 1992, p. 386; 1996, p. 125) 
 
However, Walton contends that the relation also holds in the opposite direction, i.e., that 
presumptive reasoning can explain some crucial features of the argument from ignorance. He 
defines the argument form ignorance as “a negative type of knowledge-based or presumptive 
reasoning” (1999, p. 434) and contends that arguments from ignorance “can be quite 
reasonable presumptive arguments” (2001, p. 157). Various logicians, rhetoricians, and 
argumentation scholars acknowledge the latter view since most presentations of the (fallacy 
of) argumentum ad ignorantiam include a reference to the famous presumption of innocence.1 
Given the usual tendency of explaining the (practical) argument from ignorance in terms of 
the paradigmatic (practical) presumption, one may wonder whether all types of arguments 
from ignorance can be explained, in some relevant respects, by referring to presumptions and 
presumptive reasoning.  
Starting from this explanatory interdependence, it is only natural for Walton to 
conclude that presumptive reasoning and the argument from ignorance are “so closely 
entangled that it is hard to distinguish one from the other” (2008a, p. 50). Some scholars 
appear to share this view. For instance, while discussing the relationship between inquiry and 
argument from ignorance, Cummings (2002, pp. 120-1) adopts Walton’s characterization 
quoted above. In the recent paper on the argument from ignorance, Tuzet (2015, p. 46) 
appears to have a rather Waltonian intuition that presumptive arguments (made in ignorance) 
might “collapse into” arguments from ignorance. Finally, according to Walton’s 
interpretation, Alfred Sidgwick’s traditional account of presumption “might amount to 
nothing more than an argumentum ad ignorantiam” (2014, p. 15). 
 Are presumption and the argument from ignorance strongly similar in the sense that 
the former explains the latter and vice versa, as suspected above? To advance a clear-headed 
theory of presumption, we need to sort out this issue, and that is the main aim of this paper. In 
it, I explain various senses in which the two might be considered similar and argue that 
Waltonian intuition is unsupported—the strong similarity thesis (SST) between presumptions 
 
1 Usually, this reference seeks to show that arguments from ignorance are not always fallacious (see, e.g., 
Hamblin 1970; Tindale 2007; Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels 2009; Copi, Cohen and McMahon 2016, etc.). 
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and arguments from ignorance is untenable.2 However, it is important to note that the present 
analysis focuses exclusively on the epistemic versions of presumptions and arguments from 
ignorance: the paper explores whether the “initial” dialectical presumption, understood as a 
material (epistemic) starting point of the dialogue, is strongly similar to a conclusion of the 
(epistemic) argument from ignorance. As our introductory remarks indicate, the theoretical 
similarity appears clear on the surface. For this reason, I analyze their relationship in some 
depth. 
 The paper unfolds in five parts. First, I outline a standard dialectical approach to initial 
presumption (Sect. 2). Second, I present the “textbook version” of the argument from 
ignorance (Sect. 3). Third, I test the purported similarity from two interrelated but distinct 
perspectives: the structural perspective (Sect. 4.2) and the normative perspective (Sect. 4.3). 
From the structural perspective, the analysis shows that presumptive reasoning and the 
argument from ignorance “depend” on the absence of defeaters in structurally different ways. 
From the normative perspective, the analysis shows that presumptive reasoning typically 
allows the opponent to have more defeating options. As a result, a broader set of negative 
conditions determines the acceptability of an initial presumption. The analysis also indicates 
that presumptions and arguments from ignorance do not distribute dialectical obligations in a 
similar way (Sect. 4.4). In the final section, I explain the importance of the present analysis 
and sketch some potential implications of its results (Sect. 5). 
 Most generally, this paper underlines that initial presumptions and the epistemic 
argument from ignorance merit distinct treatment. Not only do they have different 
foundations, allow different defeating strategies, and entail different dialectical obligations, 
but they also typically belong to different stages of argumentative discussion. While initial 
presumptions naturally belong to the “opening stage,” the arguments from ignorance typically 
belong to the “argumentation” or, perhaps, “concluding” stage of a discussion.3 Taking the 
strong similarity for granted would conceal the previous differences, thereby hindering, rather 
than stimulating a clear-headed study of presumption.  
   
2. The standard dialectical account: presumptions as starting points 
 
The studies of presumption in argumentation theory involve different theoretical goals, 
sources of inspiration, and, accordingly, different methodologies. (1) The more traditional 
approach is inspired by the judicial (technical) meaning of presumption. It relies on legal 
traditions and explores the relationship between presumptions and obligations in rule-
regulated (idealized) dialogues (Kauffeld 2003). (2) The more recent approach is inspired by 
the non-technical, “plain,” or “common” meaning of presumption. It relies on the concept of 
presumption used by ordinary people in day-to-day communication and explores the 
relationship between presumptions and obligations by analyzing different kinds of speech acts 
(such as accusing, proposing, or advising) (see Kauffeld 1998, 2003, 2005). In this paper, I 
 
2 I construct the “strong similarity” as a conjunction of two entailments, the ignorance-presumption entailment 
(IPE) and the presumption-ignorance entailment (PIE), and argue that both IPE and PIE are untenable (although 
not always from the same perspective of analysis). This version of the SST is certainly inspired by Walton’s 
remarks, but it is difficult to estimate whether it fully represents his view. At least two factors make the 
estimation difficult—first, Walton’s account of the similarity lacks detailed elaboration and, second, his notion 
of presumption has changed over the years (for a survay, see Bodlović 2017). Hence, the present analysis does 
not directly focus on criticizing Walton’s original view. Rather, it focuses on testing the version of the SST 
which, I believe, is the most plausible. 
3 The differentiation between the opening, the argumentation, and the concluding stage, primarily linked to the 
pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, is common in argumentation theory (for details, see Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 2004, pp. 57-62). Interestingly, pragma-dialecticians also interpret presumptions as material 
starting points of a dialogue (see van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002; Houtlosser 2003). 
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present and analyze presumptions in line with the traditional dialectical approach, inspired by 
the technical meaning of presumption.       
Standard dialectical approach constructs presumptions as propositions that do not need 
to be argued for once the opponents challenge them. Since the proponent’s obligation to 
defend proposition (if requested by the other party) follows from one of the most fundamental 
rules of reasonable dialogue (see Rescher 1977, pp. 29-30; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
2004, pp. 138-141), presumptions belong to a set of dialectically privileged propositions. 
They exempt the proponent from the burden of proof and allocate the dialectical obligation on 
the opponent’s side.4 
 Different explanations of this privilege provide grounds for distinguishing different 
kinds of dialectical presumptions. For instance, proposition i can be dialectically privileged 
because the proponent is not obliged to provide sufficient reasons for i. Suppose that i has a 
“common ground” status—either the interlocutors have explicitly agreed that i is acceptable 
or the proponent can reasonably expect that the other party accepts i since, in the normal 
circumstances, i is uncontroversial and its acceptance is considered reasonable (e.g., 
“Smoking is unhealthy”). In the latter cases, the proponent is not immediately obliged to 
argue for i if requested to do so. It is important to emphasize that i usually acquires the 
common ground status precisely because the interlocutors are (or should be) aware of the 
sufficient evidence in i’s favor. I call the presumptions of the latter kind “initial dialectical 
presumptions.”5 Initial presumptions are material starting points of a dialogue, and they stand 
good until overturned by a sufficiently strong defeater (see Rescher 2006, p. 25; van Laar and 
Krabbe 2013, p. 210; Lewiński 2017, pp. 604-606). The case of Smith and Jones asking for 
directions is a good example here.6  
 
4 Rescorla (2009) calls this view dialogical foundationalism. He labels the opposing view, doubting the existence 
of privileged propositions in dialogue, dialogical egalitarianism. For details regarding the relationship between 
the two approaches, also see Rhode (2017).  
5 In many respects, the concept of initial (or shared) epistemic presumption is closely connected to Rescher’s 
(2006) notion of “cognitive presumption.” However, our concept of initial presumption might be less restrictive. 
As presented in this paper, initial presumptions can arise from both doxastic states (by means of presumptive 
inference) and non-doxastic states. By contrast, Rescher seems to suggest that cognitive presumptions arise 
(only) from non-doxastic states and are not inferred from some pre-established premises (2006, pp. 22-23).    
6 Presumptions are “taken as true until defeated” propositions. It is important to note, however, that not all 
propositions of the latter kind are presumptions. Assumptions, for instance, are also taken as true until defeated, 
but there are many open questions concerning the relationship between presumptions and assumptions. For 
instance, there is a controversy whether they are distinct kinds of inferences (e.g., Kauffeld 2003, p. 139, 142; 
Rescher 2006, p. 21) or, unlike presumptions, “assumptions are not the conclusions of previous inferences” 
(Godden 2017, p. 499). Scholars also disagree whether presumptions and assumptions are distinct kinds of 
speech acts (e.g., Walton 1993, p. 138) or the difference is deeper since presumptions (see Kauffeld 2003, p. 
144) or, perhaps, assumptions (see Bermejo-Luque 2016, p. 10) are not speech acts. Most generally, there is no 
consensus on how to logically conceptualize the difference between two concepts: some scholars treat 
presumptions and assumptions as subtypes of suppositions, i.e., as “neighboring subclasses of a larger genus” 
(Kauffeld 2003, p. 139), whereas others contend that presumptions are a subclass of assumptions (e.g., Scott 
Jacobs, according to Kauffeld 2003, p. 139; Rescher 2006, p. 29; Bermejo-Luque 2016, p. 9). However, scholars 
agree that presumptions and assumptions can be distinguished in terms of “strength.” That is, presumptions are 
“taken as true” on stronger grounds than assumptions and, for this reason, they are “load-bearing (unlike 
assumptions and hypotheses)” (Godden 2017, p. 508) and have some “probative weight” or “bite” (Rescher 
2006, p. 20; p. 23). As a result, presumptions are more difficult to defeat: whereas the opponent can (typically) 
defeat presumption only by providing convincing reasons, she can defeat assumption by providing a challenge 
(see Kauffeld 2003, p. 142) or simply by rejecting it (see Godden and Walton 2007, pp. 326–327). Thus, 
according to the standard dialectical characterization, presumptions, unlike assumptions, reverse the burden of 
proof (Walton 1993, p. 138).  
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 By contrast, some presumption p can be dialectically privileged because the proponent 
is obliged neither to provide nor to have sufficient evidence for p.7 The interlocutors are not 
aware of sufficient evidence for p, but the proponent nevertheless presumes p for the sake of 
making progress in deliberation. For instance, Ullmann-Margalit (1983) and Godden (2017) 
construct presumptions as claims that are held acceptable for non-epistemic reasons in the 
context of evidential uncertainty and deliberation pressure. In their view, if the evidence does 
not sufficiently discriminate between p and ~p, our decision depends on whether p is true, 
there is a pressure to make a decision, and proceeding on p is more practically justified than 
proceeding on ~p (e.g., it promotes social safety), then we may presume p and act upon it 
until the (imagined) opponent provides a sufficiently strong defeater. In these special 
circumstances, the proponent of p does not carry the burden of proof. 
 The analysis in this paper focuses on the dialectical presumptions of the first kind. I 
start from the features possessed by presumptions as epistemic starting points of a dialogue 
and explore the similarity between these “initial” presumptions and the “textbook” argument 
from ignorance.8 Hence, the conclusions of the analysis should not be uncritically generalized 
to the so-called “practical dialectical presumptions,” as understood by Ullmann-Margalit, 
Godden, and, occasionally, Walton (2008b, 2014). Bearing this clarification in mind, let us 
explore the nature of presumption in some detail. 
 
2.1 LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS AND INITIAL DIALECTICAL PRESUMPTIONS 
 
In a technical sense, “presumption” is a legal term used to denote various mechanisms of 
distributing probative obligations.9 A famous legal example is the presumption of innocence, 
requiring that the accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty. That is, during a 
criminal trial, the defense is not required to prove the defendant’s innocence, and it is, in that 
sense, dialogically privileged. By contrast, the prosecution is required to prove the 
defendant’s guilt (beyond a reasonable doubt) to rebut the standing presumption. 
Argumentation scholars often discuss this rule of law as a paradigmatic example of 
presumption (see Macagno and Walton 2012; Godden and Walton 2007; Rescher 2006; 
Freeman 2005, etc.).  
 Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that initial dialectical presumptions strive 
to reconcile the following two intuitions. One the one hand, some propositions should be 
privileged in a dialogue (i.e., should not carry the burden of proof), but, on the other hand, 
some of the privileged propositions should be defeasible (i.e., should be retracted once 
sufficiently strong defeaters arise).10 In our introductory example, both Smith and Jones 
initially accepted p (“The shortest way to reach the city center...”) which made p became a 
shared dialogical commitment (a dialogical starting point). As such, it is both privileged and 
defeasible. It is privileged in the sense that, once Jones challenges p, Smith does not have an 
obligation to provide arguments (until Jones substantiates his challenge). It is also defeasible 
 
7 For a short discussion on the difference between these two kinds of presumption, in the context of Walton’s 
theory, see Bodlović (2017, pp. 521-524). 
8 For the sake of brevity, I will sometimes talk about the similarity between presumptions and arguments for 
ignorance. This formulation, however, is neither precise nor entirely accurate. More precisely, I explore the 
similarity between a typical presumptive reasoning and a typical argument from ignorance, or the similarity 
between a typical presumption and a typical conclusion of the argument from ignorance. 
9 A recent analysis of the various conceptions of presumption in law was offered by Gama (2017). Surveys 
regarding legal presumptions can also be found in Walton (2014), Macagno and Walton (2012), and Rescher 
(2006). 
10 In other words, not every privileged proposition is a “fixed concession.” For a more detailed description of 
these intuitions see Lewiński (2017). On the dialogical properties of “fixed concessions” and “presumptions,” 
from the perspective of critical reactions they permit, see van Laar and Krabbe (2013).  
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in the sense that Smith becomes obliged to retract the presumptive status of p if Jones makes a 
satisfactory case against it. However, if Jones fails, the presumption p stands, and he is 
obliged to concede it.  
 Most generally, if p is a standing presumption, the opponent is allowed both to 
concede p and to attack the acceptability of p, and she is obliged to do one thing or the other 
(see, e.g., Pinto 2001, pp. 3-4). Suppose now that, at time t, the opponent refuses to concede a 
presumption (by offering a challenge). What happens at t1? At t1, the opponent becomes 
obliged to attack the acceptability of p (and the proponent is exempt from the burden of 
proof). What exactly does this mean from the opponent’s perspective? What particular 
dialectical rights underlie her obligation to attack the presumption? What attacking 
(defeating) strategies is she allowed to use? This appears to be one of the fundamental 
questions for our purposes. To answer it properly, we must discuss the foundations 
(sources/grounds) of the initial presumptions.  
 
2.2 FOUNDATIONS OF INITIAL PRESUMPTIONS: INFERENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION  
 
Although the traditional approach links presumptions to a particular distribution of 
obligations, neither legal nor argumentation scholars agree on the precise role that 
presumptions play in this distribution. Some authors define the presumption as a (1) rule that 
authorizes p and, thereby, asymmetrically allocates dialectical obligations (see, e.g., Prakken 
and Sartor 2006). The legal example of such rule is “If somebody is accused, then presume 
that she is innocent until proved guilty.” Others define the presumption as (2) output of a 
presumptive rule, a conclusion p or, more precisely, a distinctive modal status of proposition p 
(“[Presumably,] Smith is innocent”) (e.g., Hansen 2003; Walton 2008b, 2014; Godden 
2017).11 Thus defined, a presumption does not allocate the burden of proof (in a strict sense) 
but rather signals its asymmetrical allocation for the proposition at hand. In this paper, I 
follow the latter tradition. The view that we infer presumptions from presumptive rules (and 
basic facts) will provide a template for explaining the foundations of presumption, and this is 
crucial for our comparison of presumption and the argument from ignorance. 
 The usual way of accounting for the foundations of presumption is to treat a 
presumption as a conclusion of reasoning.12 For instance, Walton (2008b, 2014) interprets 
“presumption” (presumed fact) as a conclusion of “presumptive reasoning,” which involves a 
“basic fact” and a “presumptive rule.” Our introductory example illustrates this structure: 
from (1) the basic fact “Jill testified that the shortest way to reach the city center…” and (2) 
presumptive rule “Normally, we should trust other people” (or alternatively, “Normally, we 
should believe that people speak honestly and truthfully”), Smith may (3) presume “The 
shortest way to reach the city center...” (given that the evidence does not indicate anything 
 
11 The lines dividing these traditions are often blurry. In Rescher’s account, for instance, both presumptive rules 
and the results of their application are “presumptions:” presumptive rules are abstract (generic) presumptions 
which, when applied, produce concrete (specific) presumptions (2006, pp. 33-35). 
12 Ullmann-Margalit (1983) studies presumptions (presumed facts) within the deliberation framework and treats 
them as conclusions of (practical) reasoning. Rescher emphasizes that specific presumptions are taken to be true 
for pragmatic reasons, due to the cost-effective principle (presumptive rule) that they rest upon. Plumer (2017) 
argues that presumptions are components of arguments, either their assumptions or presuppositions, and are 
inherently based on conventional rules. Although his approach significantly differs from the judicially inspired 
dialectical approach to presumptions, Kauffeld also treats presumptions as conclusions of inferences (see 
Kauffeld 2003). Bermejo-Luque (2016) holds that presumptions are not inherently inferential, but can act as 
components of inferences, both as premises and conclusions. Finally, Freeman (2005) contends that 
presumptions are (typically) based on not-inferential epistemic sources and should be treated accordingly. 
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unusual regarding Jill’s testimony).13 In Walton’s terms, Smith’s reasoning has the form of a 
defeasible modus ponens. This kind of inferential reconstruction reveals that presumptions are 
not stipulations, but rather “conclusions of some prior arguments” (Lewiński 2017, p. 605). 
Although the proponent is not dialectically obliged to provide prima facie reasons for the 
initial presumption, she is undoubtedly obliged to have good reasons.14 As the previous 
reconstruction shows, Smith has (sufficient) reasons for “The shortest way...” even though he 
is not obliged to provide them.15  
We have briefly presented one standard account of the structural (logical) nature of 
presumption’s foundations. But what justifies presumptions qualitatively speaking? 
According to various legally-inspired authors, presumptions can be based on status quo, as 
well as “fairness,” “eminent authority,” “persistent good judgment,” “the collective 
agreement,” “appearance of truth,” “suppositions about what is normal and likely,” 
“plausibility,” “the normative acceptability of error,” etc. (Kauffeld 2003, p. 138). The list 
becomes even longer once we take non-technical presumptions into account. In Kauffeld’s 
view, for instance, ordinary speaker infers presumption p from “the grounds that someone will 
have made that the case rather than risk criticism, painful regret, reprobation, lose of esteem 
or even punishment for failing to do so” (p. 140). However, as far as initial dialectical 
presumptions are concerned, it is crucial to know how things normally work (or should work). 
Initial presumptions are supposed to be based on the commonsensical, widely-accepted and 
uncontroversial presumptive rules, such as: “Normally, we should trust our perception and 
memory,” “Normally, we should draw conclusions from experience,” “Normally, we should 
trust science and experts,” “Normally, we should draw our expectations from social 
conventions,” etc. Precisely because these rules are (or should be) accepted by reasonable 
interlocutors (and the basic facts are meant to be transparent), the opponent should be able to 
reconstruct the foundations of initial presumptions efficiently, and the proponent should not 
be (initially) obliged to provide reasons.  
 Importantly, the inferential reconstruction of the presumption’s foundations does not 
entail that all initial presumptions are, in fact, “inferentially justified.” In contemporary 
epistemology, “inferential justification” is a technical term which connects justification of a 
belief to doxastic states—a belief p is inferentially justified if and only if it logically follows 
(either deductively or inductively) from some set of justified beliefs (see Feldman 2003, p. 50; 
Hasan and Fumerton 2016). By contrast, in Godden and Walton’s (2007, p. 314) inferential 
account, presumptions can also be justified by non-doxastic reasons such as perceptual states. 
For instance, someone’s contention “Presumably, there are clouds in the sky” is usually not 
justified due to another justified belief, but due to the perceptual state of seeing the clouds in 
the sky.  
 
13 The presumptive rule involved here is sometimes called the “presumption of veracity” (e.g. Kauffeld 2003) or 
the “presumption of natural trustfulness” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, pp. 70-71). 
14 In terms of the distinction offered by Aijaz, McKeown-Green and Webster (2013), initial presumption may 
unevenly allocate the “dialectical burden,” i.e. exempt the proponent from providing (sufficient) argumentative 
reasons, but the proponent may still need to satisfy an “attitudinal burden” of having (sufficient) reasons. 
15 Of course, foundations of initial presumption may (again) surface during the dialogue. Firstly, in some cases, 
the opponent’s critical reaction may reveal that she made the wrong reconstruction of presumption’s foundations. 
Secondly, the opponent may explicitly ask the proponent to show the foundations of presumption. In both cases, 
the proponent may provide explicit reasons for presumption, but this does not mean that she accepts the burden 
of proof. First, the proponents may offer argumentative reasons because they “find it practically useful to 
substantiate their position even though they may be under no particular obligation to do so” (Kauffeld 1998, p. 
263). Second, proponents may offer reasons that are not argumentative in the strict sense. For instance, the 
proponent would not offer reasons to argue that presumption is acceptable, i.e., to persuade the opponent but to 
explain why it is acceptable. Its acceptability can well be explained, but it still does not need to be argued for. 
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 Hence, Godden and Walton’s inferential reconstruction, that I rely on, is primarily a 
theoretical tool used to express and analyze the foundations of presumptions and it is 
compatible with the view that some initial presumptions are not, in fact, “inferentially 
justified,” i.e. that they do not arise inferentially from doxastic states. Initial presumptions are 
based on prima facie foundations16 and these foundations can include both doxastic and non-
doxastic states (reasons). 
 
2.3 DIALECTICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN PRESUMPTION CRITICISM 
 
The previous characterization of presumptive reasoning may shed some light on the dialogical 
rights involved in presumption criticism. The opponent’s obligation to criticize the 
acceptability of presumption includes at least three particular rights—she is allowed to (1) 
attack the presumption (conclusion) directly, (2) attack the basic fact (premise), and (3) attack 
the application of the presumptive rule (conditional).17 Relying on Pollock’s terminology 
concerning epistemic defeaters (e.g., Pollock 1987), let’s illustrate these strategies using our 
introductory example.  
 First, Jones can try to attack the presumption directly and thereby “rebut” the 
presumptive reasoning. This strategy requires an argument against the presumed proposition, 
i.e., an argument that seeks to show that “The shortest way to reach the city center…” is false. 
Jones may argue that the second street to the right is not the shortest way to reach the city 
center since it leads them outside the city. Second, Jones can attack the basic fact. Pollock 
does not discuss this strategy, but argumentation scholars usually call it a “premise tenability 
criticism” (van Laar and Krabbe 2013, p. 204). Jones may argue that Jill misunderstood 
Smith’s question. Consequently, she did not testify “The shortest way to reach the city center 
is...”, but “The shortest way to reach the City Center is...”, where the “City Center” stands for 
a shopping mall. Finally, Jones may try to “undercut” the reasoning by showing that 
application of the defeasible presumptive rule is not reliable in the particular case. For 
instance, if Jones suddenly recalls that locals usually deceive tourists for fun, then Smith 
cannot legitimately conclude that the directions are correct solely on the basis of Jill telling 
him so. His reasoning is not rebutted, for the falsity of the presumption has not been 
indicated: Jill’s directions can be both correct and accepted on unreliable grounds. The 
presumption is, however, undercut, for Smith now lacks reliable foundations indicating that 
Jill’s testimony is true.   
 Importantly, the undercutting strategy is not identical to the tenability criticism of a 
presumptive rule. The presumptive rule, stating that “Normally, we should trust other people,” 
is not attacked at all. Both parties still agree that we should usually trust other people. It is just 
that the new information (the unusual habit of deceiving tourists) prevents the presumptive 
rule to apply correctly. 
 
16 In this paper, prima facie foundation (or prima facie reason) for p is interpreted as any kind of foundation 
(reason) for p that is susceptible to defeaters, i.e. a reason that justifies p only in the absence of defeaters. 
Therefore, prima facie justification is not “justification 'on the first look' but rather justification 'other things 
being equal'” (Senor 1996, p. 554). 
17 This set of attacking (defeating) strategies is not exhaustive. In our example, the presumptive rule is 
“Normally, we should trust other people.” The opponent may accept this rule and attack its application in a 
particular case. Following Pollock, I call this the undercutting strategy. But she is also allowed, at least in 
principle, to attack the tenability of presumptive rule, e.g., to argue that we should not normally trust other 
people. Although the tenability criticism of presumptive rule is allowed, I don’t include it in the analysis for two 
reasons. First, presumptive rules tend to be so basic that in everyday contexts, where ordinary presumptions take 
place, their tenability is rarely attacked. For instance, the general tenability of “Normally, we should trust our 
senses” is hardly questioned anywhere but in epistemological journals. Second, the arguments in this paper do 
not depend on the analysis of this strategy. Thus, I will leave it out for the sake of simplicity. 
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 If the strong similarity thesis were true, then the abovementioned dialectical rights and 
obligations would be expected in dialogical settings where arguments from ignorance are 
typically used. In Sect. 4.4, I will argue that this expectation is ultimately unwarranted, which 
makes the strong similarity thesis unconvincing. But to get to this point, I first provide a brief 
characterization of the argument from ignorance and discuss some supradialogical differences 
between initial presumption and the argument from ignorance. 
 
3. The argument from ignorance: the standard view 
 
Contemporary literature distinguishes at least two types of argument from ignorance. The 
original type introduced by John Locke is only briefly explained in Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. In Locke’s words:  
 
Another way that men ordinarily use to drive others, and force them to submit their 
judgments, and receive the opinion in debate, is to require the adversary to admit what 
they allege as a proof, or to assign a better. And this I call argumentum ad 
ignorantiam. (Locke 1995, p. 56) 
 
However, the analysis in this paper starts from the more common type of the argument from 
ignorance usually presented in logical textbooks.18 The so-called “textbook” argument from 
ignorance (TAI) has a somewhat different form:  
 
(TAI) It is not known/proven that p (~p)  [ignorance premise] 
 Therefore, ~p (p). 
 
TAI has been traditionally known as an informal fallacy. For instance, the absence of 
evidence for “The bar sells orange juice,” in principle, cannot serve as a good reason for a 
conclusion “The bar does not sell orange juice.”19 Scholars have commonly expressed this 
point by saying that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Although this is 
generally true, TAI can also be a reasonable argument both in epistemic and practical 
contexts.20  
Let us start from the ignorance premise “It is not known that the water is 
contaminated” as a reason to conclude “The water is not contaminated.” If experts have 
thoroughly examined the quality of water, then the following conditional is acceptable: “If 
water were contaminated, then the contamination would be found.” Assuming that experts 
have examined the quality of water and did not find any contamination, it is plausible to 
conclude that the water is not contaminated. Structurally speaking, we would conclude (1) “A 
is not true” from the ignorance premise (2) “A is not known to be true” and a conditional (3) 
“If A were true, then A would be known to be true” (Walton et al. 2008, p. 98).21 Crucially, 
without the premise (4) “Experts have thoroughly examined the quality of water” the previous 
 
18 For a detailed analysis of Locke’s and textbook argument from ignorance, see Krabbe (1995). 
19 For instance, if Smith wasn’t even searching for evidence that the particular bar sells orange juice, i.e., if he 
did not check the bar’s price list, then the absence of evidence for “The bar sells orange juice” would hardly 
justify his conclusion “The bar does not sell orange juice.” 
20 For a discussion about the epistemic and practical version of TAI see, e.g., Wreen (1989), Krabbe (1995), 
Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008), and Tuzet (2015). 
21 According to this counterfactual formulation of a conditional (connection premise), an ignorance premise is a 
negation of consequent. Hence, the conclusion follows by (defeasible) modus tollens. However, it is also 
intuitive to “read” an ignorance premise as an antecedent of a conditional “If A is not known to be true, then A is 
not true.” In this case, the conclusion follows by (defeasible) modus ponens.  
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conditional would hardly be acceptable—the connection between the ignorance premise and 
conclusion would not be reliable. With this premise backing the conditional, however, our 
conclusion becomes the conclusion of a good “epistemic argument from ignorance” (Walton 
et al. 2008, p. 99) or a good argument based on “negative evidence” (Macagno and Walton 
2011, p. 95).  
 TAI can also be a good practical argument. Suppose that the outcome of deliberation 
depends on p and p is evidentially uncertain. If proceeding on p avoids more serious 
consequences, the absence of evidence for ~p is a plausible reason to conclude p. In Walton’s 
well-known example, we need to decide how to handle a weapon, and it is uncertain whether 
the weapon is loaded. Making a wrong decision can be very costly, but we are aware that 
proceeding on “The weapon is loaded” reduces the risk of serious (potentially fatal) 
consequences. Hence, until we are completely certain that the weapon is not loaded, we will 
conclude that it is loaded. Here, the argument from ignorance is the instance of “negative 
practical reasoning” (Walton et al. 2008, pp. 99-100). The contaminated water example and 
the loaded weapon example indicate that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with arguments 
from ignorance. As Hahn and Oaksford (2007, p. 53) remark, there will be “cases when they 
are weak and cases when they are strong, as with other types of argument.” This outcome 
coheres rather well with the strong similarity thesis since initial dialectical presumptions are 
not described as fallacious. 
 Before proceeding any further, it should be stressed the practical version of TAI is 
indeed similar to (paradigmatic) practical presumptions. According to Ullmann-Margalit 
(1983), Godden (2017) and, occasionally, Walton (2008b, 2014), presumptions are non-
epistemic means used in deliberation. The proponent is not obliged to prove p (while the 
opponent is obliged to prove the contrary) when there is a pressure to make a decision, this 
decision depends on whether p is true, p is uncertain but proceeding on p is (more) practically 
justified (than proceeding on ~p). Since a decision is surely (more) practically justified if it 
avoids serious consequences, the loaded weapon example is a paradigmatic example of 
practical presumptive reasoning. In effect, one version of the strong similarity thesis appears 
to be true—(a paradigmatic type of) practical presumptive reasoning is identical to the 
(practical) argument from ignorance. 
 However, this paper is not concerned with practical presumptions and practical 
arguments from ignorance. By contrast, it analyses the similarity between initial epistemic 
presumptions and epistemic arguments from ignorance. In other words, it explores whether 
the similarity that appears to hold in the “practical reading” also holds in the “epistemic 
reading” of the two phenomena.  
 
4. Is the strong similarity thesis tenable? 
  
In this section, I will explore the relationship between presumptions and arguments from 
ignorance by testing the strong similarity thesis. I will argue against the “strong similarity”—
typically, presumptions and arguments from ignorance are different from both the structural 
and the normative perspective because they involve different foundations (Sect. 4.2), and 
different conditions of defeat (Sect. 4.3). Since they bring different dialectical rights and 
obligations, they are different from the dialogical perspective, as well (Sect. 4.4).  
 As already stated, I construct the strong similarity thesis (SST) as the conjunction of 
two entailments, the ignorance-presumption entailment (IPE) and the presumption-ignorance 
entailment (PIE). Before putting the similarity to this test, however, the interpretation of 
“similarity” needs to be clarified. In what respects are initial presumptions and “textbook” 
arguments from ignorance (TAI) supposed to be similar? In Sect. 4.1, I propose four answers 
to this question. Once the most plausible interpretation of similarity is selected, I explore in 
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some detail whether this particular interpretation renders initial presumption and TAI strongly 
similar. 
 
4.1. THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SIMILARITY 
 
In making the similarity explicit, we can begin by focusing on the absence of positive reasons. 
Let us consider the following interpretation:  
 
(S1) There are no positive reasons supporting either the presumption or the conclusion 
of TAI. Yet, they are both (allegedly) acceptable. 
 
S1 is the least plausible interpretation of similarity. As explained in Sect. 2.2, the acceptability 
of initial presumption depends on prima facie foundations that are typically constituted by 
positive reasons. These reasons play a crucial role for the epistemic acceptability of p, and 
they continue to be normatively relevant for the acceptance of a dialogical presumption, as 
well.22 In effect, S1 is false—the presumption cannot be similar to TAI due to the lack of 
positive reasons in its support. Since there is no similarity, there cannot be strong similarity 
either. 
 However, there is a simple solution to the latter problem. We only need to shift our 
focus from the mere existence of positive reasons to their explicit presence in the dialogue. 
Let us propose the following: 
 
(S2) The proponent does not provide any positive reason supporting either the 
presumption or the conclusion of TAI. Yet, they are both (allegedly) acceptable. 
 
S2 offers some improvement but is, nevertheless, false. As the contaminated water example 
shows, epistemic arguments from ignorance lean on positive reasons quite explicitly and it is 
not clear why the proponent could not provide the positive fact (i.e., that experts have 
examined the quality of water) as a reason to support the conditional premise. Admittedly, 
this positive reason is not an immediate (direct) reason for the conclusion, but it is still 
necessary for its acceptability. Hence, S2 is not a plausible interpretation, and since there is no 
similarity, there cannot be strong similarity either. 
 Although it renders S2 implausible, the contaminated water example provides clear 
guidelines for constructing the third interpretation of similarity.  
 
(S3) The proponent does not provide and is not obliged to provide any positive 
immediate reason supporting either the presumption or the conclusion of TAI. Yet, 
they are both (allegedly) acceptable. 
 
This interpretation of similarity is true, but it is also misleading. By stressing that the 
proponent does not provide, and is not obliged to provide, an immediate positive reason, S3 
obscures the fact that the proponent typically does not provide and she is, by definition, not 
obliged to provide any argumentative reason (either positive or negative) in support of an 
 
22 Of course, one may insist that some (sufficient positive) reason would be normatively relevant only if the 
proponent were obliged to provide this reason in the dialogue. But this is obviously problematic. For instance, if 
the conclusion “You should stop smoking” (P) hinges on the tacit premise that smoking is not healthy, and this is 
recognized by all the parties in the dialogue, then the proponent may not be obliged to provide “Smoking is not 
healthy” (Q) as an explicit argumentative reason. However, this does not render Q irrelevant for the dialogical 




initial presumption. By contrast, in arguing from ignorance, the proponent typically does 
provide a negative reason to support her conclusion and to meet the burden of proof. This 
difference reveals the crucial difference concerning dialectical obligations—whereas a 
conclusion of the argument from ignorance typically does not exempt the proponent from the 
burden of proof, the initial presumption is, by definition, dialectically privileged.23 So, as long 
as conditions and obligations of providing reasons are concerned, S3 seems to select only 
those aspects that are in the similarity’s best interest. Since this is rather problematic, S3 can 
hardly help to advance a clear-headed study of presumptions, and it is, thereby, unsuitable for 
our purposes. 
The most promising interpretation of similarity is not concerned with the (dialogical) 
irrelevance of positive reasons, but the normative relevance of defeaters. We can formulate it 
as follows: 
 
(S4) Both the acceptability of the presumption p, and the acceptability of TAI’s 
conclusion p “depends on” the absence of a  “sufficiently strong defeater” (provided by 
the opponent).  
 
This interpretation of similarity is intuitive, accurate, and unbiased, which makes it a suitable 
starting point for testing the strong similarity thesis (SST). However, in the following 
sections, I will argue that the vagueness of “depends on” and “sufficiently strong defeater” 
weakens the proposed similarity, i.e., that once these notions are made precise, initial 
epistemic presumption and epistemic argument from ignorance part ways and become 
different from the structural, normative, and dialogical perspective. In other words, I will 
argue that although S4 is true, the SST is false.  
  
4.2. THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE: THE NATURE OF DEPENDENCY RELATIONS 
 
To see why the notion of “dependency” is vague, let us suppose that p is the conclusion of a 
(defeasible) modus ponens argument, and c is any condition that contributes to p’s 
acceptability. Thus defined, c can represent different elements in the structure of the 
argument. In the simplest case, c can be either the conditional or the antecedent. In the more 
complex case, c can also be some reason that supports the conditional or, perhaps, the reason 
that supports the antecedent. Accordingly, the notion of “dependency” is ambiguous and the 
statement “p depends on c” is vague: the conclusion p can depend on c either directly (c is the 
conditional or an antecedent) or indirectly (c is a reason that supports the conditional or a 
reason that supports an antecedent).  
 This ambiguity explains why presumptive reasoning and the argument from ignorance 
(TAI) fail to be strongly similar from the structural perspective. Suppose that the acceptability 
condition C, relevant for the present purposes, is defined as “the absence of a sufficiently 
strong defeater.” In our introductory example of initial presumption, C represents neither the 
basic fact (antecedent) nor the presumptive rule (conditional). Instead, it specifies under 
which circumstances it is reasonable for Smith to presume “The shortest way to reach the city 
center...” based on Jill’s testimony.24 Thus, C is only indirectly relevant for the acceptability 
 
23 As mentioned in the introduction, some scholars suggest that (fallacious) arguments from ignorance (illicitly) 
shift the burden of proof. Technically, I don’t think this is true. In Sect. 4.4, relying on Krabbe’s (1995) 
terminology, I shortly explain the difference between an “appeal to ignorance” that shifts the burden of proof 
(without providing a reason) and the textbook argument from ignorance (where the proponent provides a 
negative reason). 
24 Instead of a basic fact or a presumptive rule, C appears to be a necessary condition for the reasonable 
application of a presumptive rule. 
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of Smith’s presumption. We can express this by the “typical presumption-dependency 
relation” (PD), where the expression “depends on” is conveniently substituted.  
 
(PD) The acceptability of (the typical presumption) p [indirectly depends on] C. 
 
By contrast, the acceptability of the conclusion p of the argument from ignorance (TAI) 
directly depends on C, at least in part.25 As we have seen, TAI has the so-called “ignorance 
premise” stating the absence of a sufficiently strong rebutting defeater. Since the ignorance 
premise is a conditional’s antecedent (or, in the alternative formulation, a negation of the 
conditional’s consequent), it follows that C is directly relevant for the acceptability of p. We 
can express this by the “TAI dependency relation” (TD):  
 
(TD) The acceptability of p [directly depends on] C. 
 
Bermejo-Luque and Rescher recognize the difference between the two dependency relations. 
Bermejo-Luque observes that “presumptive inferences appeal to ignorance in order to point 
out that a possible defeater for the warrant (which is a presumption) does not obtain, whereas 
typical arguments from ignorance characteristically appeal to ignorance as the very reason to 
conclude” (2016, p. 21). Rescher expresses the same point by saying that, in presumptive 
reasoning, “ignorance is not a ground or premise for which to reason but a circumstance in 
which one reasons as best one can” (2006, p. 2) and concludes that the presumptive argument 
is an argument in ignorance rather than the argument from ignorance. Thus, typical initial 
presumptions and textbook ad ignorantiam “depend” on the absence of defeaters in 
structurally different ways.  
However, initial dialectical presumptions are not always typical. Some initial 
presumptions may well be conclusions of textbook ad ignorantiam. Acknowledging the 
existence of these exceptional cases will lead to a more inclusive account of dependency 
relation. Let us express this by the “complete presumption-dependency relation” (CPD): 
 
(CPD) The acceptability of (the presumption) p [either directly or indirectly depends on] C. 
 
CPD may give the strong similarity thesis (SST) another chance. However, the comparison of 
CPD and TD renders SST untenable.  
To see this, we must recall that the tenability of SST requires the tenability of both the 
ignorance-presumption entailment (IPE) and the presumption-ignorance entailment (PIE). 
Let’s start by analyzing IPE. If the textbook ad ignorantiam entails presumptive reasoning 
from the perspective of dependency relations, then the dependency relation expressed by TD 
should entail the dependency relation expressed by CPD. This happens to be the case. 
Namely, if p directly depends on C, then we may conclude “Either p directly depends on C, or 
p indirectly depends on C.” Nevertheless, if the strong similarity thesis holds from the 
perspective of dependency relations, then the dependency relation in CPD should entail 
dependency relation in TD. This entailment does not work. It does not follow from “Either p 
directly depends on C, or p indirectly depends on C” that p directly depends on C. Since we 
assumed that both PIE and IPE are necessary to claim the strong similarity, SST does not hold 
 
25 The acceptability of the TAI’s conclusion p directly depends on the absence of a rebutting defeater. By 
contrast, the absence of an undercutting defeater appears to be a necessary condition for the reliability of a 




when the dependency relations of the presumption and textbook ad ignorantiam are 
concerned.  
 The previous analysis assumed that presumption and argument from ignorance depend 
on the same acceptability condition C, and explained why they do not depend on C in a 
structurally similar way. In simple words, while the argument from ignorance is, by 
definition, a type of negative inference, the typical presumptive reasoning is not. In the next 
section, I deepen the analysis of similarity by scrutinizing the acceptability condition C. I 
argue that the notion of a “sufficiently strong defeater” is also vague and that, as a result, the 
strong similarity thesis (SST) is not plausible from the normative perspective.  
 
4.3. THE NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE CONTENT OF ACCEPTABILITY CONDITIONS 
 
I have proposed earlier that presumptions and arguments from ignorance are similar because 
their acceptability depends on “the absence of a sufficiently strong defeater,” i.e., on C. Let us 
express this by the so-called “similar acceptability condition” (SA).  
 
(SA) The acceptability of p depends on [the absence of a sufficiently strong defeater].26  
 
This statement is uncontroversial. Regardless of how we interpret p in SA, either as a 
presumption or as a conclusion of the argument from ignorance, SA seems to hold, and the 
similarity exists.  
Nevertheless, the dependency on the absence of defeaters is surely not enough to 
render presumptive reasoning and argument from ignorance similar in any intriguing way. 
After all, in any non-deductive (or non-monotonic, defeasible) argument, the acceptability of 
the conclusion depends on the absence of defeaters, but this hardly makes different sorts of 
non-deductive arguments “strongly similar.” For instance, it would be counterintuitive to 
claim that enumerative induction is strongly similar (let alone identical) to statistical 
syllogism, or that it is difficult to distinguish the argument from expert opinion from the 
argument from analogy. This aspect of similarity is too general to make the strong similarity 
thesis theoretically interesting.  
 More importantly, once we unpack the vague notion of “a sufficiently strong 
defeater,” it becomes clear that presumption and argument from ignorance appeal to different 
sets of defeaters. While a typical initial presumption is susceptible to three types of defeaters 
(rebutting defeater, undercutting defeater, premise tenability criticism), the conclusion of the 
ad ignorantiam depends only on the absence of a rebutting defeater and an undercutting 
defeater.27 In other words, the “typical presumption acceptability condition” (PA) and the 
“ignorance acceptability condition” (IA) are different instantiations of the “similar 
acceptability condition” (SA).  
 
(PA) The acceptability of (the typical presumption) p depends on [p is not rebutted, q 
is not proven untenable, and the connection between q and p is not undercut]. 
 
26 Notice that SA is nothing but the paraphrase of S4.  
27 Due to the content of an ignorance premise, one may come to believe that the argument from ignorance is 
susceptible only to the rebutting defeater. This is, however, false. As the contaminated water example has shown, 
some arguments from ignorance explicitly lean on indications that support the reliability of the connection 
between the ignorance premise and the conclusion—the fact that experts examined the water increases the 
reliability of the connection between “It is not known that the water is contaminated” and the conclusion “The 
water is not contaminated.” Given that these arguments recognize the normative relevance of conditions 
increasing the connection’s reliability, they should also recognize the normative significance of conditions 




(IA) The acceptability of the conclusion p depends on [p is not rebutted, and the 
connection between q and p is not undercut]. 
 
As soon as a slightly less abstract comparison is made, presumption and the argument from 
ignorance part ways—they become easily distinguishable, and the strong similarity thesis 
(SST) ceases to hold. Let’s explain this conclusion in terms of the ignorance-presumption 
entailment (IPE). If the acceptability conditions assumed by the argument from ignorance 
were strongly similar to ones assumed by presumptive reasoning, then satisfying the 
acceptability condition in IA would entail satisfying the acceptability condition in PA. But 
this is hardly true—there is no reason to think that “p is not rebutted and the connection 
between q and p is not undercut” entails, in addition, “q is not proven untenable.”28 Since IPE 
is untenable and both PIE and IPE are necessary to ensure strong similarity, SST does not 
hold when the acceptability conditions of presumption and ad ignorantiam are concerned. 
However, there are at least two strategies that the proponent of SST can use in 
response to the previous argument. First, she could argue that, in principle, IA is not complete 
(correct). The first strategy would restore the strong similarity by showing that the argument 
from ignorance recognizes all the three types of a sufficiently strong defeater. The advocate of 
SST may argue that the core of the argument from ignorance is the ignorance premise, and the 
conclusion will be acceptable only if the ignorance premise is tenable. Thus, the complete 
version of IA would include the same set of defeaters as PA and, as a result, the strong 
similarity thesis would hold. 
The general problem of this strategy lies in the fact that, in the case of the argument 
from ignorance, we cannot easily distinguish the premise tenability criticism from the 
rebutting defeater. To see this, let us imagine what does the tenability criticism of an 
ignorance premise “There is no sufficient reason for ~p” require. To render this ignorance 
premise untenable, I believe, we must offer at least one reason for ~p. But offering a reason 
for ~p comes down to an attempt to prove the contrary, and the latter is the very definition of 
a rebutting defeater. Therefore, in the particular case of ad ignorantiam, we typically reduce 
the tenability criticism of the ignorance premise to the existence of a rebutting defeater. In 
effect, the acceptability conditions of the two remain easily distinguishable: unlike typical 
initial presumption, the conclusion of the argument from ignorance cannot depend on three 
types of a defeater in any genuine or informative sense.29 
However, the advocate of SST has the second another strategy at her disposal. She 
may try to restore the similarity by claiming that sometimes, PA is not correct. Since some 
initial presumptions are conclusions of the epistemic arguments from ignorance, some initial 
 
28 By contrast, PIE is plausible—satisfying the acceptability condition in PA entails satisfying the acceptability 
condition in IA. Namely, once the acceptability condition for the presumption is satisfied, the presumption p is 
neither rebutted nor undercut, and this means that the acceptability condition for the ad ignorantiam is satisfied 
too. 
29 I do not claim that tenability criticism and rebutting defeater are coextensive. One could, perhaps, offer a 
rebutting defeater without offering a tenability criticism of a particular ignorance premise. (For instance, I may 
come to believe that the water is contaminated because I drank some water before and now I feel sick. This may, 
perhaps, rebut the conclusion “Presumably, the water is not contaminated” without entailing that the ignorance 
premise “Our scientific methods did not detect the contamination” is untenable). Rather, my point is that the 
converse is hardly possible—one cannot offer evidence that we detected contamination (i.e., tenability criticism) 
without offering some evidence that water is contaminated (rebuttal). Importantly, this is not to say that a good 
tenability criticism is always a good rebutting defeater—some counterexamples are possible here. However, the 
opponent who tries to prove that some contamination was detected is surely “in the same line of business” as 
somebody who tries to prove, either successfully or unsuccessfully, that the water is contaminated. I thank the 
reviewer for pressing this clarification. 
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presumptions are defeated only by rebutting and undercutting. Consequently, PA and IA 
(sometimes) include the same acceptability condition. Although this is true, the latter move is 
quite desperate as a strategy of restoring the strong similarity. Exceptional cases cannot 
support the strong similarity thesis—that some initial presumptions are epistemic arguments 
from ignorance does not imply that this is typically the case. Some proposition may (still) 
have the acceptability condition of a (typical) presumption without having the acceptability 
condition of the argument form ignorance. Hence, since PIE is untenable, SST is untenable, as 
well. 
 In summary, not only do typical initial presumption and textbook argument from 
ignorance include structurally different foundations, but they also have different acceptability 
conditions. When the normative role of defeaters is concerned, the conclusion of the typical 
ad ignorantiam seems to be privileged in comparison to the typical initial presumption: while 
the absence of both rebutting and undercutting defeater is sufficient to make the conclusion of 
the ad ignorantiam acceptable, it is only necessary (but, typically, not sufficient) to make 
presumption acceptable. In some sense, typical initial presumption entails the higher negative 
standard of acceptability—there is a broader set of restraints, a broader set of genuine 
restrictions that the proponent will (possibly) need to accommodate.  
 I believe that there is a lesson here concerning the nature and the limits of the 
presumption’s privileged status. Intuitively, we can render p normatively privileged either by 
making it easy to justify p or by making it hard to defeat p. It seems that a typical initial 
presumption is privileged in the first sense but not in the second. In dialogue, the proponent is 
not obliged to provide sufficient reason to render presumption acceptable, which makes a 
presumption, in a dialectical sense, “easy to justify.” However, the initial presumption is also 
easily defeated.30 The opponent has (at least) three genuine options to defeat the typical initial 
presumption and (arguably) only two options to defeat the conclusion of epistemic ad 
ignorantiam. This shows that initial presumptions are not so privileged when defeating is 
concerned. It is quite common to characterize the presumption in terms of its privileged 
status, and this analysis clarifies the nature and the limits of this privilege.  
 In the final section, I test SST by comparing attacking rights and obligations that 
argument from ignorance and presumptive reasoning bring in dialogical contexts. Since most 
theories of argumentation make dialectical rights and obligations essential in defining 
presumptions or presumptive reasoning (see Walton 2014, 2008b; Godden and Walton 2007; 
Rescher 2006, 1977; Freeman 2005; Pinto 2001, etc.), the dialogical explanation is indeed 
theoretically relevant. Here, the dialogical analysis represents the implementation or extension 
of the normative perspective (i.e., the perspective of acceptability conditions).  
 
4.4 SST AND DIALECTICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
 
In his analysis of the appeals to ignorance, Krabbe (1995) suggests that the proponent may 
respond to the opponent’s challenge (at least) in two characteristic ways: by introducing a 
counterchallenge, and by asserting an ignorance premise. This means that features of appeals 
to ignorance can be studied in (at least) two characteristic dialogue fragments. In the first 




30 By saying that it is easy to defeat a typical presumption, I only mean that different defeating strategies are 
available. This (formal) view is compatible with the fact that, in reality, defeating presumptions may indeed be 
hard since presumptions are usually based on widely-accepted commonsensical rules and transparent facts or 
since, for instance, the standard of proof is set very high. 
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P:  p 
O:  Why p? 
P:  Why ~p? 
 
By introducing the counterchallenge “Why ~p?” the proponent shifts the burden of proof. She 
refuses to offer a reason for p and demands the argument to the contrary. This is one way of 
saying: “My contention p stands good as it is until you prove me the contrary.”31 Accordingly, 
this dialogue fragment distributes the opponent’s rights and obligations in the following way. 
In the next move, O is allowed both to concede p and to attack p (by rebutting it). O is also 
obliged (at least from the proponent’s perspective) to choose among available options: she 
must either concede p or attack p (by rebutting it). If O refuses to concede p, then she 
becomes obliged to rebut p, i.e., she must provide a sufficiently strong argument for ~p. 
 The first dialogue fragment may raise some concerns regarding the previous 
characterization of the argument from ignorance (TAI). Notice that, in the first fragment, the 
proponent does not provide any reason for the acceptance of p. By employing a 
counterchallenge, she requests reasons, and this is quite different from providing them. So, 
one may come to believe that our structural and normative characterizations of TAI were 
incorrect. From the structural perspective, we proposed that p directly depends on an 
ignorance premise, but this cannot be true if there is no premise. From the normative 
perspective, we proposed that p is susceptible to an undercutting defeater, but this cannot be 
true if there is no connection to be attacked.32 However, I do not think that these concerns 
threaten the previous characterization of TAI for one simple reason: this fragment expresses 
an appeal to ignorance, but it does not express the argument from ignorance. Since the 
proponent does not offer any reason for a conclusion, she does not offer an argument, and 
since there is no argument—there is no argument from ignorance either. Accordingly, this 
fragment should affect neither the previous characterization of TAI nor previous conclusions 
regarding the similarity between TAI and presumptive reasoning.33 
In another case of an appeal to ignorance, the proponent responds to the opponent’s 
challenge by offering an explicit ignorance premise. The following fragment expresses the 
dialogical implementation of TAI. 
 
P:  p 
O:  Why p? 
P:  You don’t have a sufficient reason for ~p. 
 
 
31 This particular appeal to ignorance is usually portrayed as a dialectical fallacy because the proponent responds 
to a legitimate challenge by illicitly shifting the burden of proof (e.g., Woods and Walton 1978). In addition, 
Krabbe argues that the proponent is committing a straw man fallacy. Namely, the opponent is requested to prove 
something that she did not claim: she is requested to prove ~p despite only expressing critical doubt regarding p. 
Hence, this appeal to ignorance involves a shift of attitude or an internal dialectical shift (Krabbe 1995, p. 256).  
32 Clearly, if there is no premise (reason), there is no connection between a premise and a conclusion, and if there 
is no connection, then there is no undercutting defeater either. 
33 To give this fragment its due, perhaps we should treat it as a dialogical precondition, or a dialogical root of 
TAI. Suppose that in the fourth step, right after the proponent’s counterchallenge, the opponent just remains 
silent—she simply does not respond to the proponent’s counterchallenge. In the fifth step, then, the proponent 
makes his ex silentio move: “Since you have not proved ~p, p is acceptable.” In this extended version of the 
fragment, however, the proponent draws his conclusion from the ignorance premise. This means that our 
characterization of TAI is accurate and, again, there is no reason to doubt our findings concerning the similarity 




Once the distribution of the opponent’s dialectical rights and obligations in the next, fourth 
step of the dialogue is concerned, this dialogue fragment is different than previous one: O is 
now also allowed to undercut P’s argument. Let us examine the fragment in some detail.  
 Again, O is allowed to concede p and to attack p by rebutting it. O is also not allowed 
to attack P’s reason for p in any genuine or informative sense. That is, although P offers an 
argument based upon explicit ignorance premise, criticism of the ignorance premise may be 
reduced to the rebutting strategy (as explained in Sect. 4.3). However, O is allowed to 
undercut P’s argument—in the subsequent steps of the dialogue, O can legitimately contend 
that her lack of sufficient reasons for ~p is not a reliable indicator that p is acceptable, and 
support this contention by some concrete reason r. Finally, O is obliged to choose among 
available options: she must either concede p or attack p. If O refuses to concede p, then she 
becomes obliged to offer a sufficient argument against the acceptance of p. The latter 
argument can contain a rebutting or an undercutting defeater.  
 It seems that the two appeals to ignorance entail different distributions of the 
opponent’s dialectical rights and obligations in the next, fourth step of the dialogue. However, 
each of these distributions is still relevantly different from the one produced by typical 
presumptive reasoning. I will explain the difference between typical presumptive reasoning 
and TAI in terms of ignorance-presumption entailment (IPE) and presumption-ignorance 
entailment (PIE). 
 The typical presumptive reasoning and TAI are relevantly different both from the 
perspective of O’s attacking rights and O’s attacking obligations. In typical presumptive 
reasoning, O is allowed to (1) rebut presumption p, (2) attack the tenability of premise q, and 
to (3) undercut the connection between q and p. In TAI, O is genuinely allowed to (1) rebut 
conclusion p and to (3) undercut the connection between an ignorance premise q and 
conclusion p. This indicates that PIE does, while IPE does not hold from the perspective of 
dialectical rights. That is, it is possible to derive O’s rights to rebut conclusion and to undercut 
the connection between the ignorance premise and a conclusion from the conjunction of O’s 
typical rights involved in presumption criticism. However, it is not possible to derive the 
larger conjunction of O’s typical rights involved in presumption criticism from only two 
members of this conjunction.  
 The dialectical obligations are also different. Once O decides to attack presumption p, 
she is obliged to “Either (1) rebut p, or (2) attack the tenability of q, or (3) undercut the 
connection between q and p.” Once O decides to attack ad ignorantiam, she is genuinely 
obliged to “Either (1) rebut p, or (3) undercut the connection between q and p.” This indicates 
that IPE does, while PIE does not hold from the perspective of dialectical obligations—it is 
not possible to derive “O is obliged to rebut p, or to undercut the connection between q and p” 
from the broader disjunction of O’s dialectical obligations (involved in presumption 
criticism). Since we assumed that both PIE and IPE are necessary to claim the strong 
similarity, SST does not hold when rights and obligations related to presumptive reasoning 
and textbook ad ignorantiam are concerned. Basically, this is a dialogical way of saying that 
the argument from ignorance and typical presumptive reasoning include different 
acceptability conditions.  
 Presumptions, as portrayed in this paper, are essentially dialectical phenomena, so it is 
appropriate to study their features in dialogical settings. However, the relevance of the 
dialogical analysis does not lie only in its appropriateness, but it also enables us to deepen our 
understanding of the difference between presumptions and arguments from ignorance. It 
enables us to understand that the difference is not only found in the sets of available attacking 
strategies but that these different sets also pose different conditional rights and obligations. 
Assuming this richer dialogical ontology, the strong similarity thesis still does not hold—IPE 
does not hold from the perspective of dialectical rights, while PIE does not hold from the 
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perspective of dialectical obligations. As a result, typical initial presumption and the epistemic 
argument from ignorance are different from the structural, normative, and dialogical 
perspective.  
 
5. What is the upshot of the previous analysis? 
 
Why is the ultimate upshot the previous analysis? What are the (broader) theoretical 
implications of its results? 
 Clearly, the previous analysis shows that initial presumptions and arguments from 
ignorance merit distinct treatment. They are similar in a fewer respects than it may appear at 
first, and the remaining similarities are either generated by ambiguities, based on a 
problematic (biased) selection of features, or are simply too broad to be theoretically 
interesting. It follows that the strong similarity thesis is false. We can notice many differences 
between typical initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance, either from the structural, 
normative, or dialogical perspective. 
 Besides being false, the strong similarity thesis is also methodologically unhelpful. 
That is, argumentation scholars often emphasize that good theory of argumentation must 
provide methods for the “analysis” and “evaluation” of arguments. By accepting a strong 
similarity, we would often throw together items with distinct inferential structures (during the 
argument analysis), and distinct normative requirements (during the argument evaluation). 
The strong similarity thesis also conceals that initial presumptions and arguments from 
ignorance naturally belong to different stages of an argumentative discussion. While initial 
presumptions have to do with the very foundations of the dialogue and are accepted at the 
“opening stage,” arguments from ignorance typically represent a particular kind of 
argumentative strategy and most naturally belong to the “argumentative stage” of the 
dialogue. So, it is rather difficult to anticipate the methodological benefits of accepting the 
strong similarity thesis. The analysis offered in this paper helps us to dismiss a possible 
misconception, and I believe that this is helpful both cognitively (theoretically) and 
methodologically. 
 The previous analysis also contributes to the study of fundamental aspects of 
presumptions, such as their foundations and force (strength) (Godden and Walton 2007). For 
instance, it makes clear (albeit in an indirect way) that initial (shared/epistemic/cognitive) 
presumptions and practical presumptions are quite different phenomena: while paradigmatic 
practical presumptions (as defined by Ullmann-Margalit and Godden) are meant to be 
structurally identical to (practical) arguments from ignorance, typical initial presumptions are 
not structurally identical to (epistemic) arguments from ignorance. This conclusion is directly 
relevant to the ongoing investigations of the different kinds of presumptions and their 
corresponding foundations.  
 Finally, our analysis may open a new perspective for studying the strength of 
presumption. Scholars usually define the strength of presumption in terms of how difficult it 
is (for the opponent) to overturn it—the more demanding the standard of proof for ~p, the 
stronger the presumption p.34 However, our analysis points out that the standard of proof is 
not the only important factor. How difficult it is to defeat a presumption could also depend on 
the particular set of defeaters that the opponent has at her disposal. Suppose, for instance, that 
p is a typical initial presumption and r is the presumption based on an ignorance premise. The 
opponent will have fewer “genuine” attacking strategies to defeat r and, in some sense, this 
 
34 In other words, if the opponent is allowed to defeat p only by providing conclusive reasons for ~p, then the 
presumption p will be stronger than some presumption r that can be defeated by any reason for ~r (see, e.g. 
Ullmann-Margalit 1983, p. 152; Rescher 2006, p. 18). 
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will make it more challenging for her to defeat r. Thus, all else being equal, the presumption r 
will be stronger than the presumption p: when two presumptions presuppose the same 
standard of proof, the one with a more restricted set of defeaters might be considered stronger 
than the other. Thus, our analysis of acceptability conditions may provide guidance for the 
more comprehensive theory of the presumption’s strength. 
 The primary aim of this paper, however, is to advance a clear-headed study of 
presumptions. In order to construct a robust theory of presumption, the relationship between 
presumptions and arguments from ignorance needs to be sorted out. So far, this relationship 
lacks a thorough analysis—some authors acknowledge (some) similarity, others express their 
reservations, but none of them, to my knowledge, offers an elaborate analysis. Thus, the last 
potential benefit of this analysis is “dialectical” in nature—it seeks to enhance the discourse 




According to Douglas Walton, presumptions and the arguments from ignorance are “so 
closely entangled that it is hard to distinguish one from the other” (2008a, p. 50). In this 
paper, I argued that Waltonian intuition is either limited (at best) or ill-founded (at worst) 
since initial presumptions and epistemic arguments from ignorance do not share any 
significant similarities. 
I showed that the typical presumptive reasoning and the argument from ignorance are 
different both from the structural and the normative perspective. From the structural 
perspective, they have different foundations: typical initial presumption only indirectly 
depends on the absence of (any) defeater, whereas the conclusion of the argument from 
ignorance is directly drawn from the absence of a rebutting defeater. From the normative 
perspective, initial presumptions are typically susceptible to a broader set of defeaters. Since 
they can be rendered unacceptable by the broader set of defeaters, their acceptability entails a 
higher (negative) standard. We have also demonstrated this in the dialogical context, in terms 
of the opponent’s attacking rights and obligations.  
The previous analysis identifies the limitations of the theoretical proposal occasionally 
suggested by some authors, and this makes the analysis, I believe, both theoretically and 
methodologically useful. The analysis also (indirectly) contributes to the ongoing 
investigation of the different kinds of presumptions, their foundations, the conditions of 
defeat, and the estimations of strength. Finally, it seeks to initiate an analysis of the theoretical 
proposal which, despite its presence in the literature, has not been carefully analyzed so far.  
 
Acknowledgments: Some parts of this article were presented at the workshop Argumentations and 
conversations (March 13 2017, University of Granada, Spain) and at the PCCP meeting (April 5 2018, Faculty 
of Philosophy-University of Groningen, The Netherlands). I thank the organizers and the participants for their 
comments and constructive criticisms. I am especially indebted to Jan Albert van Laar who made many helpful 
suggestions on improving the earlier versions of the article. I am also grateful to Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Barteld 
Kooi, Karolina Kudlek, and Diego Castro Amenábar. Finally, I express my sincere gratitude to the editors and 
anonymous reviewers of Argumentation for their thorough analysis, detailed and constructive response, 




Aijaz, I., McKeown-Green, and A. Webster. 2013. Burdens of proof and the case for 




Bermejo-Luque, L. 2016. Being a correct presumption vs. being presumably the case. 
Informal Logic 36 (1): 1-25. 
 
Bodlović, P. 2017. Dialogical Features of Presumptions: Difficulties for Walton’s New 
Dialogical Theory. Argumentation 31 (3): 513-534. 
 
Copi, I. M., C. Cohen, and K. McMahon. 2016. Introduction to Logic, 14th ed. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Cummings, L. 2002. Reasoning Under Uncertainty: The Role of Two Informal Fallacies in an 
Emerging Scientific Inquiry. Informal Logic 22 (2): 113-136. 
 
Feldman, R. 2003. Epistemology. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
Freeman, J. B. 2005. Acceptable premises. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
 
Gama, R. 2017. The Nature and the Place of Presumptions in Law and Legal Argumentation. 
Argumentation 31 (3): 555-572. 
 
Godden, D. 2017. Presumption as a Modal Qualifier: Presumption, Inference, and Managing 
Epistemic Risk. Argumentation 31 (3): 485-511. 
 
Godden, D., and D. Walton. 2007. A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation. 
Pragmatics & Cognition 15 (2): 313-346. 
 
Hahn, U., and M. Oaksford. 2007. The burden of proof and its role in argumentation. 
Argumentation 21 (1): 39-61. 
 
Hamblin, C. 1970. Fallacies. London: Methuen & Co Ltd. 
 
Hansen, H. V. 2003. Theories of presumption and burden of proof. In Proceedings of the 
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), eds. J. A. Blair, et al., 1-12. Windsor, 
ON: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA). 
 
Hasan, A., and R. Fumerton. 2016. Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification. In The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, 
URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/justep-foundational/, 22 May 2018. 
 
Houtlosser, P. 2003. Commentary on H. V. Hansen’s ‘Theories of presumption and burden of 
proof’. In Proceedings of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), eds. J. 
A. Blair, et al., 1-4. Windsor, ON: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA). 
 
Kauffeld, F. J. 1998. Presumptions and the Distribution of Argumentative Burdens in Acts of 
Proposing and Accusing. Argumentation 12 (2): 245-266. 
 
Kauffeld, F. 2003. The ordinary practice of presuming and presumption with special attention 
to veracity and the burden of proof. In Anyone who has a view: Theoretical contributions to 





Kauffeld, F. J. 2005. Presumptions and Shifting the Burden of Proof. Paper presented at the 
IPrA Conference, URL= http://www2.arnes.si/~ffljzagar/Kauffeld_paper.pdf, 02 July 2019. 
  
Krabbe, E. C. W. 1995. Appeal to Ignorance. In Fallacies: classical and contemporary 
readings, eds. H. V. Hansen, and R. C. Pinto, 251-265. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
Lewiński, M.. 2017. Argumentation Theory Without Presumptions. Argumentation 31 (3): 
591-613. 
 
Locke, J. 1995. Four Sorts of Arguments. In Fallacies: classical and contemporary readings, 
eds. H. V. Hansen, and R. C. Pinto, 55-57. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press. 
 
Macagno, F., and D. Walton. 2011. Reasoning from paradigms and negative evidence. 
Pragmatics & Cognition 19 (1): 92-116. 
 
Macagno, F., and D. Walton. 2012. Presumptions in legal argumentation. Ratio Juris 25 (3): 
271-300. 
 
Perelman, C., and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1969. The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on 
Argumentation. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Pinto, R. C. 2001. Argument, inference and dialectic: collected papers on informal logic (with 
an introduction by Hans V. Hansen). Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Plumer, G. 2017. Presumptions, Assumptions, and Presuppositions of Ordinary Arguments. 
Argumentation 31 (3): 469-484. 
 
Pollock, J. L. 1987. Defeasible reasoning. Cognitive science 11: 481-518. 
 
Prakken, H., and G. Sartor. 2006. Presumptions and Burdens of Proof. In Legal Knowledge 
and Information Systems: JURIX 2006: The Nineteenth Annual Conference, ed. T. M. van 
Engers, 21-30. Amsterdam: IOS Press. 
 
Rescher, N. 1977. Dialectics: A controversy-oriented approach to the theory of knowledge. 
Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
 
Rescher, N. 2006. Presumption and the practices of tentative cognition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP. 
 
Rescorla, M. 2009. Shifting the burden of proof? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234): 86-109. 
 
Rhode, C. 2017. The Burden of Proof in Philosophical Persuasion Dialogue. Argumentation 
31 (3): 535-554. 
 
Senor, T. D. 1996. The Prima/Ultima Facie Justification Distinction in Epistemology. 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 551-566. 
 




Tuzet, G. 2015. On the absence of evidence. In Argument types and fallacies in legal 
argumentation, eds. T. Bustamante, and C. Dahlman, 37-53. Cham: Springer. 
 
Ullmann-Margalit, E. 1983. On presumption. Journal of Philosophy 80 (3): 143-163. 
 
van Eemeren, F. H., and Houtlosser, P. 2002. Strategic Maneuvering with the burden of proof. 
In Advances in Pragma-Dialectics, ed. F. H. van Eemeren, 13-29. Sic Sat/Amsterdam.  
 
van Eeemeren, F. H., and R. Grootendorst. 2004. A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. The 
Pragma-Dialectical Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
 
van Eemeren, F. H., B. Garssen, and B. Meuffels. 2009. Fallacies and Judgments of 
Reasonableness. Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 
 
van Laar, J. A., and Krabbe, E. C. W. 2013. The Burden of Criticism: Consequences of 
Taking a Critical Stance. Argumentation 27 (2): 201-224 
 
Walton, D. 1992. Nonfallacious arguments from ignorance. American Philosophical 
Quarterly 29 (4): 381-387. 
 
Walton, D. 1993. The speech act of presumption. Pragmatics & Cognition 1 (1): 125-148. 
 
Walton, D. 1996. Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Walton, D. 1999. Informal fallacy. In The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., ed. R. 
Audi, 431-435. New York: Cambridge UP. 
 
Walton, D. 2001. Abductive, presumptive and plausible arguments. Informal Logic 21 (2): 
141-169. 
 
Walton, D. 2008a. Presumption, burden of proof and lack of evidence. L’Analisi Linguistica e 
Latteraria 16 (1): 49-71. 
 
Walton, D. 2008b. A dialogical theory of presumption. Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (2): 
209-243. 
 
Walton, D. 2014. Burden of proof, presumption and argumentation. New York: Cambridge 
UP. 
 
Walton, D., C. Reed, and F. Macagno. 2008. Argumentation schemes. New York: Cambridge 
UP. 
 
Woods, J., and D. Walton.1978. The Fallacy of 'Ad Ignorantiam'. Dialectica 32 (2): 87-99. 
 
Wreen, M. 1989. Light from Darkness, From Ignorance Knowledge. Dialectica 43 (4): 299-
314. 
